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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores whether it would be commercially interesting for 
historical postal operators to redefine the “last postal mile”. Indeed, the way 
the last postal mile has been defined and serviced so far has long historical 
origins and has hardly been questioned so far. Yet today, discussing the last 
mile in the postal sector is driven by three different considerations. First, 
mail volumes appear to decline, at least in the traditional letter market, 
leading to diminishing scale effects. Secondly, the changing consumer 
behavior that emerges from the ability of new information and 
communication technologies reduces somewhat the pressure on speedy 
delivery and leads to reconsider the definition of the Universal Postal 
Service in particular. Thirdly, there is a growing debate about whether or not 
access is to be granted to the competitors when it comes to the incumbent’s 
distribution network. 
All above three issues relate to the last postal mile, and thus to the 
question, whether or not some innovation is possible in the incumbent’s 
distribution channel and whether this innovation is commercially interesting. 
Given the cost-sensitiveness of the last mile, postal operators are quite 
logically seeking ways to reduce costs precisely at the distribution end of the 
value chain, for example by reducing service levels. This paper looks at 
possibilities to give more value to the last mile and perhaps even turn it into 
a business in its own right. 
This paper thus models, to our knowledge for the first time, a Receiver 
Pays Principle in the postal sector and tests it with empirical data. It is 
structured as follows: in Section 2, we briefly recall the question of the last 
mile in the other network industries so to have a better understanding as to 
                                                 
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the opinion of Swiss Post. 
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whether and how the postal last mile is similar or different. In Section 3, we 
then turn to the question of the Universal Postal Service. Indeed, mail 
distribution remains a Universal Service obligation, and it is therefore 
necessary to explore which leeway an incumbent actually has when 
exploring new options for the last postal mile. In a fourth Section, we 
examine the question of who pays for delivery. Considering that in the postal 
sector the price of delivery has been paid exclusively by the sender, this 
topic will be discussed based on academic literature only. In Section 5, we 
define the various options a historical postal operator has at its disposal 
when it comes to defining and pricing the last mile. In Section 6, we evaluate 
the option of a monthly delivery fee that the receivers would have to pay 
when choosing traditional delivery in terms of welfare and operator’s profit. 
Finally, in Section 7 we present and discuss our results. 
This paper is a concept paper at an early stage. Its aim is neither to give 
an exhaustive literature review nor to offer a tried and tested model to be put 
into practice. Rather, we would like to foster the debate about new models 
for the last mile. In particular, we would like to know whether such a model 
has been put into practice somewhere and what additional considerations are 
needed in order to analyze the issue. 
 
2.  THE PROBLEM OF THE “LAST MILE” 
The “last mile” is a typical concept of the network industries, such as 
telecommunications, railways, electricity, gas, and others more. As such, the 
last mile became an issue mainly because of the liberalization of these 
network industries, whereby the owners of the networks have given or have 
been forced by regulators to give access to their networks. More precisely, 
the concept of the last mile has been used first in the telecommunications 
sector, and is now increasingly also debated of the electricity sector. These 
two sectors, which have a high share of delivery costs in respect to total 
costs and which have a high share of fixed costs in delivery, do exhibit some 
structural similarities to the postal sector. In this chapter, we briefly recall 
the debates in these two sectors. In a concluding paragraph, we derive 
implications for the last mile in the postal sector. 
In the telecommunications sector, the issue of the last mile has emerged 
relatively late. Indeed, it is only after the liberalization of the 
telecommunications equipment first, and of the telecommunications 
backbone later that the last mile became seen as a bottleneck and 
impediment to the total liberalization. As such, the last mile in the 
telecommunications sector defines the physical cable that links the 
individual household to the dispatching central owned by the historical 
operator. It is generally not deemed economical to duplicate this last mile for 
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economic reasons. Therefore, first the European Commission and 
subsequently the national regulators have forced the historical operators to 
open up their last miles to the competitors. As a consequence, the 
competitors now have direct access to the final customers, while simply 
renting the last mile at a regulated price. More recently, the debate has 
evolved in the telecommunications sector, as technological alternatives to 
the last mile of the historical operator are emerging. Such alternatives are the 
television cable, the electrical powerline, as well as broadband wireless 
access. It is therefore increasingly debated, whether access to the historical 
operator’s last mile must be regulated, or whether technological competition 
is not sufficient in order to serve the consumers best. In short, technological 
progress in the telecommunications sector has actually made the regulatory 
debate about the last mile obsolete, and has turned it into a purely 
commercial question. Consumers now have different telecommunications 
last mile options2. 
In the electricity sector, the issue of the last mile is less evolved, yet, at 
least in the beginning of the liberalization process, very similar to the debate 
in the telecommunications sector. Indeed, with the liberalization of energy 
production, the local distributors remain monopolists, in that they own the 
connection to the final consumer at the household level. However, if the 
consumers chose to purchase their electricity no longer from their local 
distributor but from a far distant independent producer, the local distributor 
is forced by the regulator to transport this electricity again at a regulated 
price. In other words, the last mile is therefore identical to the local 
distribution network. However, unlike in the telecommunications’ industry, 
no realistic technological alternative is emerging to such distribution and 
therefore no technological or infrastructure competition appears possible, at 
least at this stage. The only feasible alternative is independent electricity 
production at the household level, which is still at its infancy. In short, the 
last mile belongs to the incumbent, who practically has no leeway to redefine 
it according to its commercial interests. However, there exists a broad 
variety of pricing schemes, such as peak load pricing or pricing according to 
the production method (e.g., environmentally friendly energy). 
                                                 
2 This also means different pricing schemes which affect consumer behavior. In the 
late 1990’s the UK industry regulator claimed that the prices for calling mobile 
phones were too high. This triggered additional research. One of the results was that 
such relatively high prices stemmed from asymmetric incentives, whereby the 
originating party paid for all of the call. It was suggested that if instead the receiver 
were to pay for some or all of the call, prices of mobiles would be lower (Doyle and 
Smith, 1998). On the other hand, Schwarz-Schilling (2001) reports that the slower 
growth of mobile telephony in the US compared to other parts of the world can be 
attributed to the RPP principle. 
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In the postal sector, the concept of the last mile is used before all by 
analogy. Consequently, some economists have equated the postal delivery 
network to a physical network. Nevertheless, this is an analogy only, and in 
reality, the postal last mile resembles much more the current situation of the 
telecommunications sector than the situation of the electricity sector. It is 
therefore imaginable that the postal customers, as the telecommunications 
customers, are being offered in the future a choice as to what they would like 
as a “last mile”, and how much they would be ready to pay for it. Inversely, 
the historical postal operators, like the telecommunications operators, 
increasingly have the option to define the kind, the quality, and the price of 
the last postal mile. For instance, Elsenbast (1996) reports findings from a 
survey, where residents could choose between payable house delivery and 
free collection at a centralised P.O. Box. He concluded that – not 
surprisingly – a majority (62%) of residents preferred house delivery but – 
perhaps surprisingly – would, in the average, be willing to pay for it. 
 
3.  THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE DELIVERY OBLIGATION 
Nevertheless, so far historical postal operators have not been completely 
free to define what they mean by “last postal mile”. As a matter of fact, and 
before being a technical and a commercial question, the last mile in the 
postal sector has mainly been a political question. We therefore also discuss 
how the political authorities have defined the last postal mile so far and to 
what extent this definition actually allows for some flexibility. 
Historically, each European operator had its own definition and practice 
of the last postal mile. A first attempt for harmonization was undertaken by 
the European Commission with its Green Book in 1992. Here, the last mile 
falls into what is called “Universal Service”. More precisely, the Universal 
Service has two dimensions, namely an upstream (collection) and a 
downstream (distribution) dimension. We are focusing here only on the 
downstream dimension of the Universal Postal Service, the ‘Universal 
Delivery Service’. At the EU level, the definition of the Universal Delivery 
Service is rather vague. Indeed, the Directive 97/67 states that the postal 
operator, which is responsible for the Universal Postal Service, must deliver 
postal items “to the home premises”. However, it does not specify a series of 
issues, such as the exact point of delivery, nor does it say anything about the 
exact time of delivery during the day, nor whether the operator may or may 
not charge last mile delivery fees (e.g., subscription fees to the households, 
specific door delivery fees). 
In other words, the European Commission allows for significant leeway 
when it comes to downstream Universal Service obligations. It is therefore 
necessary to proceed to a much more systematic analysis of what Universal 
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Delivery Service concretely is in the different countries. This analysis shows 
that, while there is significant similarity when it comes to delivery frequency 
and quality, there remain differences when it comes to the delivery point, i.e. 
where the last mile ends. In fact, most of the countries do not specify the 
delivery point, thus implicitly assuming that the Directive 97/67 applies, 
meaning that delivery has to take place to the home premises. However, 
some countries grant exceptions, authorized generally by the regulator or 
even by the political authorities. Only Denmark seems to be thinking about 
the premises where to deliver.  
In conclusion, we can see that the downstream Universal Postal Service 
as conceived from a political perspective remains quite vague – i.e., 
“delivery to the home premises” –, yet almost no country seems to be taking 
advantage of this vagueness. Switzerland appears to be unique here, 
inasmuch as the exceptions to such downstream Universal Service can be 
defined by the incumbent (i.e., neither by the political authorities nor by the 
regulator) in case delivery is particularly difficult. 
 
4.  WHO PAYS FOR DELIVERY? 
Despite of a number of structural similarities, in the postal sector it is the 
sender pays principle (SPP)3 that prevails, whereas the receiver pays 
principle (RPP) has gained widespread acceptance in other network 
industries. 
Indeed, if we look at non-postal network industries, such as 
telecommunications, we observe that the dominant pricing schemes are quite 
different. In those network industries, technological advances and 
liberalization typically lead to new services, differentiated quality standards, 
and the unbundling of the value chain. In particular, however, we find price 
differentiation with two or multi-part tariff schemes. This reflects underlying 
demand and cost considerations: Suppliers make use of market segmentation 
strategies with customer preferences being better reflected in the variety of 
products supplied. Generally, then, the presence of high shared of fixed costs 
leads to some sort of fixed access fee and variable usage prices. 
A brief, non-exhaustive look into the literature shows that a large number 
of variables influences the choice of an optimal pricing model in the 
telecommunications industry.4 For instance, there are differences between 
 
3 The analogous term in the telecom industry is „calling party principle" CPP. 
4 The existence of a network gives rise to external effects (or network effects). Two 
types of externalities are “access externalities” and “call externalities”. Access 
externalities are benefits to all members of a network when an additional user 
joins the network. Call externalities are the benefits a user receives from an 
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situations in which either party can initiate a message exchange and those in 
which only one party can do so. Other modeling features are for example, 
whether a set number of messages sent and received have the same value for 
the respective senders and receivers; or whether the receiver – when 
deciding whether to accept or not an incoming message – knows the value of 
the message in advance; whether sets of messages sent and received are 
independent of each other; whether sending a message is costly or not; or 
whether sender and recipient prices are set equal or unequal. Such model 
features have important implications on the choice of a welfare optimizing 
pricing model. By way of example, if an incoming message triggers an 
outgoing message of the same value in reply, then call externalities will be 
internalized in the demand of sending messages, if not, then a two-part 
pricing scheme might prove welfare optimizing. There are a number of 
papers analyziung such models; Hermlin and Katz (2004), for example, 
conclude that in the presence of call externalities RPP can increase welfare 
and profits5. 
 
Looking at the postal industry, we know of no system where RPP is 
currently in widespread use. We have to go back to the pre-Rowland-Hill-
area to find RPP as a common means of payment.6 However, the topic has 
been taken up again in the recent past. In 1981, Owen and Willig stated that 
postal rates constitute a deviation from efficient marginal cost pricing. The 
propose to set up a guaranteed basic service delivery and to price additional 
delivery services according to demand. Schwarz-Schilling, 2001, discusses 
an number of reasons, among them “operational costs, transaction costs and 
the relevance of distributional goals” contributing to the fact that RPP “has 
never been put into practice on a significant scale so far” (p.18). This 
conclusion relies on a set of theoretical considerations, yet the paper does not 
model or quantify costs or revenues.  
 
 
incoming message. In this paper we assume that there are both access and call 
externalities for recipients of postal messages. 
5 The results are, of course, subject to a number of model assumptions not discussed 
here. For further references see eg. Jeon, Laffont and Tirole, 2001, or Kim and 
Lim, 2000. 
6 See for details on postal reform introducing the sender pays principle e.g. Hill and 
Hill, 1880. It is interesting to note that Hill proposed that a small additional charge 
be made either in advance or on delivery (underscore by the authors) on the 
ground that in some small places the penny charge would not cover the cost of the 
delivery. However, he withdrew this suggestion later (Hemmeon, 1912). For a 
more recent discussion see e.g., Crew and Kleindorfer (1991). 
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To sum up, there are potentially a number of welfare arguments in favor 
of recipient pricing, or at least in favor of a combination of the sender pays 
principle with recipient pricing. In Section 2, we have seen that the postal 
sector can increasingly be compared with the telecommunications sector, 
and there is therefore no reason why such RPP or a combination between 
SPP and RPP cannot also be applied in the postal sector.  
Against this background we summarize three key arguments against the 
SPP as it is applied in the postal industry:  
• First, each network transaction implies that the message has a 
value for both the sender and the receiver. Efficient pricing requires, 
in principle, that prices equal marginal cost. Hence, both the sender 
and the receiver should contribute to the cost of a message. 
• Secondly, a two-part tariff scheme brings prices more in line with 
costs. The postal network, though not a physical one, entails both 
fixed and variable costs. A large part of fixed costs can be associated 
with the delivery. Thus, introducing a fixed and a variable price 
component would allow for postal rates to come closer to marginal 
costs and thus an economically more efficient pricing. 
• Thirdly, yet related to the above arguments, a receiver 
contribution would allow for a reduction of the sending tariffs This in 
turn would stimulate volumes, which in an industry with decreasing 
volumes would positively influence scale economies. 
 
5.  LAST MILE OPTIONS IN POSTAL DELIVERY 
In this Section, we show possible last mile options of a historical postal 
operator. In doing so, we combine two dimensions, namely the point of 
delivery on the one hand and the payer’s principle on the other. 
In terms of delivery point, we have seen above that the Postal Framework 
Directive 97/67 remains vague, allowing for several different possible 
delivery points, such as the doorstep (including in an apartment building), 
the house entry, and the road intersection. In addition, one must also include 
here the delivery at the P.O. Box, even this is currently not a Universal 
Service option. In terms of pricing, and as we have seen above, there are the 
two extremes, i.e., the sender pays principle as it is currently the case in the 
postal sector, the receiver pays principle, or a combination of the two. 
Combining both, we obtain the 12 following options with their 
corresponding likelihood: 
 
Table 1: theoretically possible last mile and corresponding pricing 
options 
 SPP SPP & RPP RPP 
PO Box X   
Road intersection  X X 
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House entry  XX XX 
Doorstep  XXX XXX 
 
Below, we will model the last mile option for a historical postal operator. 
However, we will be using a simplified model, whereby we will consider 
that the receivers pay a monthly fee for home delivery in case they do not 
prefer to collect their mail at the P.O. Box that is provided for free (delivery 
into the P.O. Box being paid for by the sender). Also, we will not make any 
distinction among the three possible delivery points. 
 
6.  MODEL AND CALIBRATION 
Our aim is to evaluate whether a combination of the SPP with the RPP 
performs better than the SPP on its own, in terms of total welfare. We 
restrict ourselves to the study of the monopoly situation to reduce 
complexity. 
Our model develops as follows. In the benchmark case, the SPP applies 
as it is today, thus the receiver does not pay for delivery at the doorstep. 
Starting from this benchmark, we select from table 1 two scenarios. We 
introduce the scenario “Delivery Flat Rate (DFR)”, where the receivers have 
to pay a yearly flat rate (P) to the postal service, if they want delivery at the 
doorstep. I.e. to receive the mail at the doorstep the receiver has to pay P 
units of money per year. Nevertheless, the customers also have the option to 
receive the mail for free at a P.O. Box (located at the closest post office). 
The policy DFR will allow the operator to reduce delivery costs and to have 
additional revenues (revenue associated with the flat rate customers have to 
pay if they choose to receive at the doorstep). We assume that the operator 
redistributes the additional revenues to the senders by decreasing the price 
accordingly.  
If receivers are not willing to pay the delivery fee and choose P.O. Box 
delivery, it incurs an opportunity cost of going to the P.O. Box (OC) to 
collect the incoming mail. We assume OC to be a function of household 
income w, the search costs s to realize the opportunity income, and of time t, 
needed to go from the household’s doorstep to empty the PO Box: 
 
( ) stwtwOC −⋅= βα),( , 
  
where α and β expresses the way customers value the opportunity money 
and time. Economic theory would state these two parameters to be 1. 
However, many factors are not implemented in our opportunity function. For 
example, one could argue that the opportunity cost of going to the P.O. Box 
depends also on the size of the household, whether at least one member 
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passes the post office daily, age or health conditions of the members of the 
household, whether the household receives newspapers separately from the 
rest of the mail, or number of mail pieces per week.. It would be rather 
complex and arbitrary to introduce all these variables in the model. The two 
parameters α and β give us some flexibility to get an intuitive OC-
distribution that corresponds to surveys made in Germany as found in 
Elsenblast (1996).  
The decision of the customer will depend on whether his opportunity cost 
of going to the P.O. Box is smaller or bigger than the flat rate he has to pay 
for delivery at the doorstep. If OC , then the customer will prefer to pay 
the flat rate and receive the mail at his doorstep. If OC
P≥
P< , P.O. Box 
delivery is chosen.  
In order to analyze the welfare effects of the new policy DFR we need to 
specify utility functions for senders and receivers, and a profit function for 
the postal service. For the sender side we follow De Donder et. al (2001) and 
assume a representative sender with quasilinear preferences with respect to 
money: 
 
2( , )
2
S bU q m aq q m= − + ,   
 
where q represents the quantity of mail sent and m represents the amount 
of money spent on other goods. a, b > 0 give the market size and the slope of 
the demand curve, respectively. The customer has a budget constraint 
.p q m ω+ ≤ , whereω is the initial endowment of the customer. The budget 
constraint is satisfied with equality when the customer maximizes utility. 
The corresponding demand function of the representative sender is as 
follows, 
 
1( ) ( )q p a p
b
= − .        
 
For simplify things we assume that the receivers derive a constant utility 
V of being connected to the postal network. Thus, their (quasilinear) utility 
in the monopoly case is V. In the DFR case, they are worse of because 
delivery is costly now. Thus, to receive mail at the doorstep they need pay 
the delivery flat rate P, if choosing P.O. Box their cost is OCi. The receivers’ 
utility can be written as 
 
),min( ii
R
i OCPVU −=  (1) 
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Expression (1) offers an explanation, why so far no postal service chose 
DFR. If Vi is smaller than the cost to receive mail, one would expect this 
person not to empty the P.O. Box at all. We do not implement this possibility 
in our model but assume that people will be motivated to empty their mail 
box and no network externalities are lost. This enables us to set Vi to zero for 
all households without changing the equilibrium outcome.  
The postal services costs are composed by a variable and a fixed part, 
which translates the existence of economies of scale in the market. The profit 
function of the firm can be written as 
 [ )()()(),ˆ( PACFFPnPqcpPp du ]−−−⋅+−= )π ,  
where c denotes the variable costs and n(P) is the number of customers 
that chose delivery at the doorstep. Fu and Fd are the upstream and 
downstream fixed costs. AC(P) is the avoided costs as a function of the flat 
rate P, when households do not want home delivery anymore because P is 
too high. In the benchmark case, P is zero and AC(P) = 0. If the flat rate 
were set to plus infinity in the DFR case, nobody would choose doorstep 
delivery and AC(P) = Fd. We assume that the postal services redistributes 
the earnings associated with the delivery pricing to the senders by lowering 
the stamp price from p to  according to the rulepˆ
0
)(ˆ q
PnPpp ⋅−= , where q0 is 
the mail volume of the previous period. The profit function implies that the 
only cost for the postal service of a P.O. Box is to sort and insert the mail 
into the boxes. These costs are included in c and occur also for doorstep 
delivery. Thus, we assume that the postal service can provide additional P.O. 
Boxes for free and the billing costs for the monthly delivery are negligeable. 
To compute overall welfare in the economy we just have to sum 
consumer net utility and operator’s profit. For DFR, we can find the 
consumers’ net utility by subtracting the revenues associated with the flat 
rate and the total disutility of going to the PO Box from the sender surplus. 
With this framework, we will have a positive mail volume impact for any 
negative value of price elasticity. This is because we assume that the postal 
service redistributes the additional revenues from delivery fees and avoided 
costs for P.O. Box switchers to the senders by lowering the stamp price p 
accordingly. With a negative price elasticity this leads to an increase in mail 
volume. Whether this translates into a higher overall welfare depends on the 
avoided cost function and the switching behavior of the consumers 
determined by the distribution of OC in the population. 
In order to assess the DFR’s impact on welfare, we calibrate the model 
using Swiss data. Swiss Post stated in its annual report that they delivered 
approximately 2.8 billion pieces of addressed mail in 2004. Recent data of 
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Swiss Post suggest that the overall price elasticity is approximately -0.3. 
Parameters a and b can directly be computed using prices, quantities and 
price elasticities of 2004. The expression for the price elasticity is as follows 
 
1 p
b q
ε = − . 
 
On the production side, we assume the same calibration as set out Dietl et 
al. (2005). A crucial point is the avoided cost function. The function reflects 
how delivery costs depend on the fraction of consumers choosing P.O. Box 
instead of mailbox. We assume a function of the following kind: 
 
Graph 1: Avoided Cost Function 
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Total avoided costs decompose into two different parts. If a consumer 
switches to P.O. Box delivery, first the time is saved to reach his mailbox 
from the route the mail carrier passes every day. This component is a linear 
function. A second component is the reduced route time. Route time reduces 
when sufficiently persons switch to the P.O. Box, so that a mail carrier does 
not have to serve a whole street for example. We assume here an exponential 
curve. 
In order to compute the opportunity cost distribution we have generated a 
random sample of 10’000 observations for each of the variables w and t. We 
assumed the households’ income and distance from the P.O. Box to be 
Exploring the “last mile” in the postal sector page 12 
independent and to follow the lognormal distribution with the following 
means and standard deviations7: 
 
Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of w and t 
 Mean Std deviation 
w (CHF) 8.933 3.507 
t  (minutes) 8,78 2,48 
 
Moreover, we assumed s = 150 CHF, α = 1 and β to be 0,7. In Graph 2 
we show the resulting demand function for doorstep delivery. 
 
Graph 2: Demand for doorstep delivery  
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7.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
We are now going to present and discuss the main conclusions of our 
model. We also perform some sensitivity analysis in order to test the 
robustness of the results. 
It is straightforward to analyze the benchmark situation, i.e. the first stage 
before the introduction of the flat rate on doorstep delivery. The uniform 
price charged by Swiss Post was on average 0.74 CHF. Together with the 
                                                 
7 Data supplied by the “Office Fédéral de la Statistique” and by Swiss Post. 
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cost structure originated a profit of 530 millions CHF (before covering the 
deficit in the postal outlets). The consumer’s surplus is in this case 
approximately 3.4 billions CHF. Total welfare is approximately 3.6 billions 
CHF. 
When we introduce the new policy of delivery with a delivery flat rate of 
100 CHF/year the average price drops be 10 cents to 0,64 CHF because of 
the postal services redistribution of the flat rate to the senders. The lower 
price increases mail volumes, which cause an increase in the operator’s 
profit of about 50 Mio CHF. The consumer’s welfare also increases by 11%. 
The increase in total welfare is of approximately 12%. Table 3 summarizes 
the results. 
 
Table 3: Results for different flat rates 
 After flat rate (CHF) 
 
Before 
flat rate 40 70 100 130 160 
Average price (CHF) 0,74 0,69   0,66   0,64   0,62   0,61   
Quantity (Mio) 2782 2840 2871 2895 2915 2934 
Consumers’ surplus (mio 
CHF) 
3423 
3627 3729 3804 3868 3942 
Firm’s profit (mio CHF) 196 223 236 245 253 259 
Total welfare (mio CHF) 3619 3849 3965 4049 4121 4201 
Welfare change (in %)  0,06 0,10 0,12 0,14 0,16 
 
In the graph below, we can observe how the consumers’ welfare and the 
firm’s profit evolve for different values of the flat rate.  
 
Graph 3: Impact of the flat rate on welfare and profit  
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Assuming a flat rate of 100 Swiss Franc per year, we can see that 
irrespectively of α  we will observe an increase in the total welfare with the 
introduction of the flat rate (Table 4). All the remaining results are robust to 
changes in α . 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis for α  
Flat rate = 100 CHF/year   α  
 
Before 
flat rate 
0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 
Demand for doorstep delivery 
(%) 
 
28% 41% 53% 65% 74% 
Average price (CHF) 0,74 0,63   0,64   0,64   0,64   0,64   
Quantity (Mio) 2782 2913 2899 2895 2896 2899 
Consumers’ surplus (mio CHF) 3423 3969 3853 3804 3789 3788 
Firm’s profit (mio CHF) 530 253 247 245 245 245 
Total welfare (mio CHF) 3619 4222 4100 4049 4034 4033 
Welfare change (in %)  0,17 0,13 0,12 0,11 0,11 
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